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Arbitrability and Public Policy: An African Perspective 
 
Joseph Mante * 
 
Introduction 
Globalisation and the expansion of international trade have led to a 
considerable expansion of the scope of commercial matters which are 
capable of settlement by arbitration. This development notwithstanding, the 
concept of arbitrability remains an important one. The international impact and 
dynamics of arbitrability has made it an important subject for discussion in 
international commercial arbitration.1  The concept has the potential to affect 
the validity of an arbitration agreement, strip an arbitrator of jurisdiction to 
determine a matter in spite of party agreement or derail enforcement of an 
award.2   It is therefore not surprising that after years of scholarly work on the 
subject, there are still concerns with the concept of arbitrability.  
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention) and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, 1985 (as 
amended in 2006) (the UNCITRAL Model Law) leave the determination of the 
issue of what subject matters are arbitrable to individual States. Historically, 
States have made such determinations on the basis of considerations such as 
public policy, which in turn, is dictated by several other factors including 
economic, political, social and cultural demands.3 There is evidence that in 
Europe and America, the effect of public policy as a determinant of what is 
arbitrable is waning.4 The implication is that public policy is no longer a bar to 
arbitration but remains one of the legal considerations at the award stage or 
during enforcement of the award. It also signals a further widening of the 
scope of matters which are arbitrable.  
                                                          
* LLB, LLM, PhD.  Lecturer, Law School, Aberdeen Business School, Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen 
1
 See Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives 
(Kluwer Law International 1999).  
2
 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award, 1958 (the New York Convention), 
Article V (2) (a); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006) (the 
UNCITRAL Model Law) Article 34 (2) (b) (i). 
3
  See Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
international arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.114. 
4
 McLaughlin, Joseph T. ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States’ (1995-1996) 59 Alb. L. Rev. 905, 915ff; 
Kirry, Antoine, ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12(4) Arbitration International 373-390. 
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Relying on relevant literature and arbitration laws, this study draws a 
comparison between arbitrability and its relationship with public policy in 
Europe and America on one hand, and the trend in Africa in an attempt to 
critically investigate the extent to which States in Africa are willing to extend 
the scope of subject-matters capable of resolution by arbitration. This study is 
important for a number of reasons. First of all, it is imperative that foreign 
entities involved in transnational commercial transactions in Africa become 
aware that the scope of subjects which are arbitrable in Europe are not 
necessarily the same as those in the African jurisdictions where they may be 
transacting business. In selecting arbitration as a preferred dispute resolution 
method, parties need to be aware of the extent to which disputes which arise 
out of their respective transactions will be arbitrable. Secondly, it is important 
that parties seeking to enforce their awards in a jurisdiction in Africa are 
aware of possible challenges under the New York Convention as a result of 
the relatively distinct scope of what may be arbitrable in the African context. 
Finally, there is a gap in the literature on the African perspective of arbitrability 
generally and the role of public policy in the determination of what is non-
arbitrable.  
The paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides a brief 
overview of the concept of arbitrability. The second section surveys the 
current trend and relationship between arbitrability and public policy in the 
European and American contexts. This is followed by an examination of the 
trend in Africa. Under this third section, approaches to the regulation of 
international arbitration, in general, and arbitrability specifically are explored. 
Then there is an examination of the scope of non-arbitrable matters on the 
continent. The fourth section discusses some of the key issues emerging from 
the material on arbitrability from Africa, how they compare with the trends in 
Europe and the persisting role of public policy. The final section pulls together 
conclusions from the discussions. 
Arbitrability 
A dispute is arbitrable if it is ‘capable of settlement by arbitration’.5 This 
definition implies that there are disputes which are incapable of resolution by 
arbitration. Disputes may be non-arbitrable for different reasons. States 
wielding power to determine how disputes arising from transactions in their 
jurisdictions are resolved may exclude certain matters from the private 
process of arbitration for reasons including public interest, public policy and 
the need for judicial protection.6 In such instances, a dispute may be 
                                                          
5
 See the New York Convention (n3), Articles II (1) and V (2) (a); the UNCITRAL Model Law (n2) Articles 34(2)(b) and 
36(1)(b)(i) 
6
 Gary B. Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International 2012)82 
SLS 2015 Annual Conference, University of York 
 
Page 3 of 20 
© Joseph Mante 2015 
 
arbitrable or non-arbitrable simply on the basis of the subject-matter involved.7 
Traditionally, this is the sense in which the concept of arbitrability has been 
used.8  
 
Viewed broadly, this is not the only reason why a specific dispute involving 
specific individuals and entities may not be capable of resolution by 
arbitration. As a consensual process, arbitration can be utilised as a dispute 
resolution process only if parties expressly or by implication9 consent to use 
the process.10 Where there is no evidence of an agreement, disputes may be 
incapable of settlement by arbitration – it has been argued that such disputes 
will be non-arbitrable.11 Similarly, disputes outside the scope of the agreement 
to arbitrate are non-arbitrable, in principle, not as a result of a statutory 
injunction but because the parties’ consent/agreement to arbitrate does not 
extend to such disputes.12 Further, Böckstiegel has argued that the concept of 
arbitrability should be view broadly beyond an objective criterion which 
focuses on subject-matter; there is a place for a subjective criterion which 
focuses on the capacity of parties to an arbitration agreement.13 In his view, 
lack of requisite legal capacity, though not traditionally considered a matter for 
arbitrability, will eventually make certain disputes incapable of settlement by 
arbitration even in the context of international arbitration.14  
 
The import of the foregoing is that the concept of arbitrability has different 
dimensions and may arise in different circumstances in the context of 
arbitration. The question whether a dispute is capable of settlement by 
arbitration can thus, be answered by looking at four different aspects of the 
arbitration process namely the subject matter of the arbitration, the existence 
                                                          
7
 Carbonneau, T.E. ‘Liberal Rules of Arbitrability and the Autonomy of Labor Arbitration in the United States’ in 
Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International 1999)para 8-1. 
8
 See Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp1) s 30 (where arbitrability is defined with a clear focus on subject-matter); 
Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international 
arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.111; Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of Ghana’s new 
Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31,32. 
9
 Situations where consent is implied. See e.g. Stellar Shipping Co LLC v Hudson Shipping Lines [2010] EWHC 
2985;[2012] 1 C.L.C. 476 where a guarantor of an agreement containing an arbitration clause was held to be bound 
by the clause even though it was not party to the original agreement and so had not expressly consented to the 
arbitration clause therein. See also Park, William W. Non-signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator's 
Dilemma (OUP 2009) 
10
 An exception here will be statutory arbitrations. 
11
 See American case of MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Exalon Indus. Inc. 138 F.3d 426 at 429 (1st Cir. 1998) 
cited in Rau, Alan Scott ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999)10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 287, 355 (where the judge 
argued that absence of arbitration agreement raises a fundamental question of arbitrability). See also Blackaby, 
Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration (5th 
edn, OUP 2009) para 2.111; Rau, Alan Scott. ‘Arbitral jurisdiction and the dimensions of “consent”.’ (2008) 24(2) 
Arbitration International 199-264.  
12
 Rau, Alan Scott ‘The Arbitrability Question Itself’ (1999)10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 287. 
13
 Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz "Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement." (2008) 2 Disp. Resol. Int'l 
123,126-128 
14
 Ibid.  
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or otherwise of an arbitration agreement, the scope of the agreement and the 
capacity of the parties. This study focuses mainly on arbitrability in the 
traditional sense, that is, as it relates to the subject-matter of arbitration - this 
is the sense in which the term is used in the New York Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.15 Even so, in the African context, it appears that the 
laws which define arbitrability and non-arbitrability often embrace both the 
objective and subjective dimensions of the concept. Consequently, some 
reference in this work to the subjective dimension of arbitrability in the African 
context is inevitable. 
 
Arbitrability in the context of Arbitration 
Arbitrability, as a concept, raises a number of questions on the process of 
arbitration. Which law governs the question of arbitrability? In what 
circumstances can the question of arbitrability be raised? Who determines the 
question of arbitrability? What are the possible consequences of non-
arbitrability on the arbitration process and its outcome? These questions are 
briefly examined in succession. In both domestic and international arbitration, 
states have the prerogative to determine what subject matters are capable of 
settlement by arbitration within their respective jurisdictions. This position is 
supported by provisions from two key instruments on international commercial 
arbitration namely the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (NYC) and the UNCITRAL Model law on 
international Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006) (the Model 
Law).16 As the determination of what is arbitrable remains a matter for 
individual states, different approaches, often influenced by public policy 
considerations,17 have been adopted by states.18 This also means a subject 
matter arbitrable in one jurisdiction may not be arbitrable in another. The 
effect is that there is likely to be confusion as to the arbitrability of a matter in 
the context of international arbitration.19 Consequently, parties to arbitration 
are free to contest the arbitrability or otherwise of a pending claim.  
 
In the context of international arbitration, the governing law for arbitrability will 
depend on a number of factors including the time it is raised. If raised in the 
course of the arbitration proceedings as a jurisdictional challenge or in 
defence to a claim, there are several possible sources of law which may 
                                                          
15
 In the African context, it appears that the laws which define arbitrability and non-arbitrability often embrace both the 
objective and subjective dimensions of the concept. Consequently, some reference to the two dimensions of 
arbitrability in the African context is inevitable. 
16
 See the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, Article V (2) (a) and  
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (as amended in 2006), Articles1(5) and 34 
(2) (b) (i). 
17
 McLaughlin (n4)915-916 
18
 Schwartz, E. A. ‘The Domain of Arbitration and Issues of Arbitrability: The View from the ICC’ (1994)9(1) ICSID 
Review 17ff 
19
 Vincent, Jennifer, ‘Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: The Implications of Conflicting Domestic Policy on 
Arbitrability and Award Enforcement’ (2015) 38 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 141 
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apply. These include the law governing the arbitration agreement or the law of 
the seat of the arbitration.20 When the issue of arbitrability is raised at the 
stage of recognition and enforcement, Article V (2) (a) of the New York 
Convention21 implies that the law of the forum of enforcement shall apply.22 
However, the question is not as simple as it appears. A tribunal dealing with 
the question of arbitrability even in the course of the arbitration cannot 
overlook and thus, may take into account the law of the place of enforcement 
for practical reasons.23  
 
A question of arbitrability may be determined either by an arbitral tribunal or a 
designated national court.24 It is widely accepted both domestically and 
internationally that the tribunal has power to determine its own jurisdiction 
under the competence-competence principle.25  Alternatively, there are, at 
least, three instances where a national court may be called upon to determine 
the question of arbitrability: firstly, where there is a repeat application by a 
party who disagrees with a first instance ruling by an arbitral tribunal on the 
question of arbitrability;26 secondly, where the relevant national legislation 
provides alternative means of dealing with jurisdictional issues directly 
through the court as is the case under section 32 of the English Arbitration 
Act, 1996; and finally, when the question of arbitrability is raised as a defence 
to the enforcement of an award under the New York Convention. 
 
Arbitrability and Public Policy: Trends in Europe and America 
The concept of public policy is notoriously difficult to define due to its vague 
confines and characteristic lack of uncertainty.27 Nevertheless, it has played a 
                                                          
20
 In French Consultant v. Egyptian Local Authority (ICC Case No.6162) (1992)XVII Yearbook Comm. Arb 153 it was 
held that the law of the seat of the arbitration (the law of Switzerland) applied to the question of arbitrability even 
though Egyptian law was the applicable law by agreement. 
21
 See also the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 36. 
22
 See Company M v. M.S.A., No.6 Cour d’appel, Brussels, 4 October, 1985 reported in XIV Yearbook Comm. Arb. 
(1989) 619 
23
 See Carbonneau T, Shattering the barrier of Inarbitrability (2011) 22 American Review of International Arbitration 
Law 573 at 596 (where the author argues that the tribunal in a given situation may be confronted with a choice 
amongst different variations of competing laws).   
24
 Matters of recognition and enforcement are within the jurisdiction of national courts –see the New York Convention, 
Article V.  
25
 See the UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 16; English Arbitration Act 1996, s. 30; Ghana’s Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act 2010 (Act 798), s.24; Scottish Arbitration Rules, Rule 19.  
26
 UNCITRAL Model Law, Article 16(3). 
27
 In Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 HLC 1, Parke B observed in relation to public policy as follows: “Public policy is a 
vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal 
rights; it is capable of being understood in different senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean ‘political 
expedience,’ or that which is best for the common good of the community; and in that sense there may be every 
variety of opinion, according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether 
an act is against public policy or not…” 
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major role in both domestic and international legal discourse on arbitration.28 
An “unruly horse”29 it may be but its influence lives on. An interim report by the 
Committee on International Arbitration of the International Law Association 
(ILA) dated 2000 on the role of public policy in the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards examined a number of possible definitions and explanations of 
the concept.30 It also explored current strands and ramifications of the concept 
for international arbitration.31 At its core, public policy is about “basic norms of 
morality and justice”32 of a state the violation of which “would be clearly 
injurious to the public good or, possibly …would be wholly offensive to the 
ordinary reasonable and fully informed member[s] of the public on whose 
behalf the powers of the State are exercised”.33 In the context of international 
arbitration, there are different notions of the concept.34 
 
Studies in America35 and Europe36 on current trends on arbitrability reveal that 
there is a shift in attitudes on, firstly, the scope of disputes that are arbitrable 
and secondly, the extent to which public policy remains a bar. Across Europe 
and America, certain disputes are regarded as generally non-arbitrable. 
                                                          
28
 See Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA Congress Series, 
1986 New York, Kluwer Law International 1987) vol 3, 177-366 (the entire work of the Working Group 2 was devoted 
to public policy in Arbitration); Loukas A Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & 
Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 1999). See also ILA, ‘Interim Report on Public Policy as a bar to 
the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (International Law Association Conference, London,2000); 
<http://www.newyorkconvention.org/publications/full-text-publications/general/ila-interim-report-public-policy-2000 > 
accessed 1 August 2015. 
29
 Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 229 at 252 per Burrough J. 
30
 See e.g.  The German Bundesgerichtshof 12 July 1990 - III ZR 174/89, NJW 1990 at  3210: “A violation of 
essential principles of German law (ordre public) exists only if the arbitral award contravenes a rule which is basic to 
public or commercial life, or if it contradicts the German idea of justice in a fundamental way. A mere violation of the 
substantive or procedural law applied by the arbitral tribunal is not sufficient to constitute such violation”; Cheshire 
and North, Private International Law (13th edn., Butterworths 1999), 123 : “… some moral, social or economic 
principle so sacrosanct ... as to require its maintenance at all costs and without exception”; and Lew, Applicable Law 
in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana 1978), 532: “…the fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, 
religious and social standards of every State or extra-national community… those principles and standards which are 
so sacrosanct as to require their maintenance at all costs and without exception”.  
31
 See ILA Report on Public Policy (n28).  
32
 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. -v- Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier RAKTA and Bank of 
America 508 F. 2d 969 (2nd Cir., 1974) per Judge Smith 
33
 Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellscaft mbh -v- Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Company[1987] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 246 at 254 per Donaldson MR 
34
 Public policy in the context of municipal law, public policy under private international law (also called international 
public policy) and trans-national public policy. For more details on these strands of the concept,  see Lalive, P. 
‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International Arbitration’ in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative 
Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration (ICCA Congress Series, 1986 New York, Kluwer Law International 
1987) vol 3, 258-318 
35
 McLaughlin (n4); Vincent, Jennifer, ‘Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave: The Implications of Conflicting Domestic 
Policy on Arbitrability and Award Enforcement’ (2015) 38 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 141-168. 
36
 See Kirry, Antoine ‘Arbitrability: Current Trends in Europe’ (1996) 12(4) Arbitration International 373-390; Baron, 
P.M. and Liniger, S. ‘A Second Look at Arbitrability: Approaches to arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and 
Germany’ (2003) 19(1) Arbitration International 27ff 
SLS 2015 Annual Conference, University of York 
 
Page 7 of 20 
© Joseph Mante 2015 
 
These include criminal matters and status-related cases involving individuals 
or corporate entities.37 Disputes relating to fraud allegations,38 bribery39 and 
competition40 (obviously issues of public interest) have in recent times 
encountered questions on arbitrability.41 These types of disputes and others 
relating to patents, family law, employment and insolvency previously 
regarded as non-arbitrable are increasingly becoming arbitrable. In the United 
States, there is a strong presumption in favour of arbitrability42 rebuttable only 
by a clear congressional intent against submitting particular disputes to 
arbitration;43 and the presumption is even stronger with disputes arising out of 
international commerce.44 The English courts have also endorsed 
presumption of arbitrability. In Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation and Others 
v. Privalov and Others,45 the English Supreme Court (per Lord Hoffmann) 
observed as follows: 
 
In my opinion the construction of an arbitration clause should start from 
the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to 
have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which 
they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same 
tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this 
presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions 
were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction.46 
                                                          
37
 E.g. the French Civil Code, Article 2060. 
38
  See the decision in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov Also known as: Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili 
Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719,1725ff  
39
  See Honeywell International Middle East Limited v Meydan Group LLC [2014] 2 Lloyds Rep.133 (where it was 
held that an allegation that an agreement was procured by bribery, even when proved, will not lead to the setting 
aside of an order for the enforcement of a foreign award, though contrary to English public policy because contract 
procured by bribes were not unenforceable under English law. See also Parish, M. (2010) ‘The proper law of an 
arbitration agreement’ (2010) 76(4) Arbitration 661-679. 
40
 In Eco-Swiss China Time Limited v. Benetton International NV (Case C-126/97) 1999 ECR1ff, an award which was 
in violation of European Union competition law (Article 81 EC) was annulled on the basis that the law constituted a 
fundamental provision essential to the working of the Community, especially, the functioning of the internal market. 
41
 Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international 
arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.117-2.143. 
42
 Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983); McLaughlin (n4) 906-
907 
43
 Vincent (n35)143 
44
 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 S Ct (1985)(the US Supreme Court held 
that a dispute is arbitrable even though the transaction concerned raised issues concerning violation of an American 
Statute on antitrust ; McLaughlin (n4) 906-907 
45
 [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719 
46
 ibid. 1725, para 13 
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There are some instances where courts have held in some European 
jurisdictions that particular types of dispute are not arbitrable47 but generally, 
the scope of arbitrable matters has widened considerably, partly as a result of 
the gradual chipping away of the influence of public policy on what may be 
submitted to arbitration.48  
 
Historically, public policy has been a key consideration in the determination of 
arbitrability.49 In America and Europe, the last three decades have witnessed 
a remarkable reversal of this trend through judicial pronouncements on 
arbitrability of public policy issues.50 The traditional position precluding 
arbitrators from dealing with public policy disputes has now given way to a 
view that the application of public policy rules should not be the sole preserve 
of judges, arbitrators can do the same. Nevertheless, even with countries in 
Europe where it is thought that the role of public policy in the determination of 
arbitrability is waning, it can be argued that public policy considerations still 
underpin either overtly or covertly some provisions on non-arbitrability.51  
 
Trends in Africa 
Developments on arbitrability and non-arbitrability in Africa can be gleaned 
mainly from national legislations and legal writings as there are limited case 
law on the subject. In this study, the arbitration laws of thirty-six countries in 
Africa were explored for information on the varied legislative approaches 
towards regulating the issue of arbitrability, subject matters which are 
arbitrable or non-arbitrable, and the extent to which public policy still remains 
an important consideration. 
                                                          
47
 In relation to  disputes involving rights which the parties are not free to dispose- see Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali 
Italiani v. Ministry of Defense 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb'n 594 (1994). See also Eco-Swiss China Time Limited (n41); 
Manfredi, Cannito, Tricorico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA C-
295-98/04 [2006] E.C.R. 1, 31 (where it was held that compliance and application of Article 81 and 82 of EC law on 
competition was a matter of public policy; UAB Kauno vandenys v WTE Wassertechnik GmbH (3K-7-304/2011) 
(where the Supreme Court of Lithuania held that disputes arising out of public procurement contracts are not 
arbitrable - for more on this case, see Daujotas, Rimantas and Audzevičius, Ramūnas, ‘Arbitrability of Disputes 
Arising from Public Procurement Contracts – Lithuanian Example’ (2012) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086349>Accessed 12 August 2015 
 
48
 See Stavros L Brekoulakis, ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and new areas of Concern’ in Loukas A 
Mistelis and Stavros L Brekoulakis (ed) Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 19-44.  
49
  For example, the Arbitration Act 2005 (Malaysia), s4 (1) (‘any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to 
arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration unless the arbitration agreement is 
contrary to public policy’); the International Arbitration Act1996 (Singapore), Article 11; the French Civil Code 2060. 
See also McLaughlin (n4)915-916; Böckstiegel, K-H. (n13); Baron, P.M. and Liniger, S. (37) 27. cf Stavros L 
Brekoulakis (n48) who argues that public policy has no role in the determination of arbitrability. 
50
 Examples from the United States: Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 
24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc.  473 U.S. 614 S Ct (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.  417 US 515 – 521. From the UK: Fiona Trust (n46); Honeywell International Middle East Limited (n40). 
See also Brekoulakis, S. ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern in Mistelis, L. A. and 
Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 
2009)19,20.  
51
 See the French Civil Code, 1804, Article 2060; the Code of Civil Procedure of the Netherlands, 1986, Article 
1020(3); the Italian Civil Procedure Code, 1990 (as amended in 2006), article 806, etc. 
SLS 2015 Annual Conference, University of York 
 
Page 9 of 20 
© Joseph Mante 2015 
 
 
Approaches to Arbitrability 
Growing influence of international arbitration as a means of resolving 
international commercial and investment disputes has made it imperative for 
African legislatures to take note. Current legislations across the continent 
reflect common acceptance of arbitration as a means of resolving both 
domestic and international disputes. Asante has observed that the 
acceptance of international arbitration has been mainly driven by a desire to 
attract investment and trade. He argues that, 
 
…most developing countries involved in negotiating international 
business transactions recognise the virtual inevitability of international 
commercial arbitration. Indeed, the acceptance of international 
arbitration has become an invariable ingredient of the liberalization 
package which developing countries provide as a sine qua non of their 
strategies to attract foreign investment, technology, international 
finance and foreign trade.52 
 
The arbitration laws on the continent also reveal deep theoretical divisions in 
the approaches to regulation of international arbitration. There is a view that 
all arbitrations are, in a sense, national in character and governed principally 
by the procedural rules of the seat of the arbitration.53  In that sense, there 
appears to be no justification for making one set of rules for domestic 
arbitration and another for international arbitration. Principles deemed 
beneficial to international arbitration must be equally beneficial to domestic 
arbitrations. A typical example of arbitration laws which reflect this view is the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 of Ghana.54 Another view argues that 
international arbitration is distinct from domestic arbitration and thus requires 
separate rules.55 There is a recognition that the validity and effectiveness of 
international arbitration does not depend solely on domestic laws of a single 
jurisdiction.56 Having separate provisions on international arbitration based on 
well-known and widely accepted principles such as those under the 
                                                          
52
 Asante, S.K.B. ‘Some Key Issues in Negotiating International Joint Ventures’ (1998) 1(1) Banking and Financial 
Law Journal of Ghana 52-71. 
53
 See the ‘mono-localisation’ theory of arbitration canvassed by F.A. Mann, ‘"Lex Facit Arbitrum," in International 
Arbitration’ (1986) 2 Arb. Int' 241 and captured succinctly in Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Three Philosophies of International 
Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in international arbitration and mediation(The Fordham 
Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308.  
54
 The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Ghana) applies to both domestic and international arbitration but 
refrains from any indication of a distinction between principles applicable to both types of arbitration. See also Liberia 
Commercial Code Title Ch 7 (2010)  
55
 The view here is closer to that of proponents of the trans-national theory of arbitration – see Emmanuel Gaillard, 
‘Three Philosophies of International Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in international arbitration 
and mediation(The Fordham Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308. 
56
 Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Three Philosophies of International Arbitration’ in Arthur Rovine (ed) Contemporary issues in 
international arbitration and mediation(The Fordham Papers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2010)305,308 
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UNCITRAL Model Law gives assurance of validity and effectiveness of an 
award and also inspires confidence in foreign parties.57 Majority of modern 
arbitration laws in Africa tend to take the middle ground for reasons including 
the need for investment and trade58 and recognition of the peculiarities of 
international arbitration. Consequently, they tend to have separate provisions 
on domestic and international arbitration (all in a single law) with varying 
differences in the extent of regulation. 
 
The differences in approach to regulation of arbitration are also mirrored in 
how the question of arbitrability is addressed. Asouzu59 identified three 
different approaches to arbitrability in the African context. The first approach 
entails omitting any reference to the word “commercial” as a means of limiting 
subject matters that are arbitrable.60 Instead, customised criteria are provided 
which cover a wider scope.61 The second approach involves providing a 
specific and comprehensive definition of arbitrable subject matters based on 
the indicative scope of the word “commercial” given under the UNCITRAL 
Model Law.62 For example, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1988 (CAP 
19) of Nigeria aim to “provide a unified legal framework for fair and efficient 
settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration and conciliation…”63 Section 
57 of the Act then defines what kinds of transactions are ‘commercial’ in 
nature.64 The third approach to arbitrability canvassed by Asouzu entails 
providing general definitions of subject matters that are arbitrable without any 
limitations. 
 
The distinctiveness of the various approaches to arbitrability runs deeper than 
sticking to the scope provided under the UNCITRAL Model law or having a 
customised scope; it has theoretical connotations. Generally, arbitration laws 
with stronger emphasis on international arbitration take a liberal view of 
arbitrability and have limited or hardly any express provisions on non-
                                                          
57
  The International Arbitration Act 2008 Act No. 37 of 2008 (Mauritius) is a typical example of arbitration law 
reflecting this view. 
58
 See Asante (n53) 
59
 Asouzu, A.A. International commercial arbitration and African states: practice, participation, and institutional 
development (Cambridge University Press 2001)140-176. 
60
 cf UNCITRAL Model Law (n2) Article 1(1) where it is stated that the law applies to international commercial 
arbitration. An indication of the scope of the word ‘commercial’ is provided in the footnote to the article. 
61
 Examples of this approach can be found in Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt and the Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 
93-42 of 26 April 1993) 
62
 See footnote to the UNCITRAL Model law, Article 1(1)  
63
 Emphasis added. See  the long title of the Act 
64
 S.57 of the Act define the word ‘commercial’ as “all relationships of a commercial nature including any trade 
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services, distribution agreement, commercial representation or 
agency, factoring, leasing, construction of works, constructing, engineering licensing, investment, financing, banking, 
insurance, exploitation, agreement or concession, joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-
operation, carriage of goods or passengers by air, sea, rail, or road”  
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arbitrability.65 This is because international arbitration is often limited to 
subject matters that are commercial in character which are largely arbitrable 
across the African continent even at the domestic level. The International 
Arbitration Act 2008 (Act No.37) (Mauritius) is an example of standalone 
legislations on international arbitration with a liberal position on arbitrability.66 
The Act provides virtually no limits on arbitrable disputes. It states that where 
jurisdiction is conferred on a court concerning a matter, it does not necessarily 
imply that such a matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration. In effect, 
matters over which the courts have jurisdiction can equally be the subject 
matter of arbitration, unless expressly exempted.  
 
Though the OHADA67 Uniform Act, 1999 has a domestic application, it is 
essentially international in character. It has a strong international focus and 
applies common rules to all arbitration which has its seat in any of the sixteen 
signatory countries.68 It has as its goal harmonisation of arbitration laws in 
member states and therefore abhors any act which can potentially stifle this 
effort. Under the Uniform Act, states and public entities are permitted to 
arbitrate their disputes and are barred from invoking “their own law to contest 
the arbitrability of the claim, their authority to sign arbitration agreements or 
the validity of the arbitration agreement”.69 With the strong international focus, 
it is not a surprise that the OHADA Uniform Act has little or no tolerance for 
national laws on arbitrability.  
 
Similarly, arbitration laws which are less emphatic on separate rules for 
international arbitration have more elaborated provisions on non-arbitrability.70 
Arbitration laws with distinct provisions on domestic and international 
arbitration tend to provide for arbitrability, non-arbitrability or both.71 It is 
instructive that for most of these laws, arbitrability and non-arbitrability are 
covered under provisions applicable mainly to domestic arbitration.72 In some 
                                                          
65
 The 1997 Draft International Arbitration Law of South Africa is an exception here. Under the proposed section 6, 
matters relating to status and arbitration agreements contrary to public policy were to be non-arbitrable. 
66
 The long title of the Act states that it is ‘[a]n Act to promote the use of Mauritius as a jurisdiction of choice in the 
field of international arbitration, to lay down the rules applicable to such arbitrations and to provide for related 
matters’. S 3(1)(c) (i) states that its provisions apply solely to international arbitration with a minor exception 
67
 The organisation for the Harmonisation of Business laws in Africa. 
68
 List of signatories: Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Cameroun, Niger, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Chad, Central African Republic, Benin and Comoros. 
69
 See the OHADA Uniform Act 1999, Art 2. 
70
 See e.g. the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2010 (Ghana); Liberia Commercial Code Title Ch 7 (2010), Article 
7. 
71
 Law No. 27/1994 Promulgating the Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters(Egypt), Articles 
1,2,11; Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements (Morocco), Articles 308-310; Law No 11/99 
of 8 July,1999 (Mozambique), Articles 5 – 6.    
72
 ibid. 
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other instances, the non-arbitrability provisions are part of the common 
clauses applicable to both domestic and international arbitration.73  
 Non-Arbitrable disputes 
Across the continent, there are many disputes which are non-arbitrable. 
These can be categorised into, at least, four groups namely status and 
capacity-related disputes, disputes relating to protected persons and 
institutions such as the family, subject matters which relate to the state or 
public interest and those categorised in this work as “generic exemptions”. 
Disputes relating to status (and capacity) are generally exempted from the 
scope of arbitration.74 Examples include disputes relating to whether a person 
is a minor, married, unmarried, divorced, non compos mentis or a citizen of a 
country. Under the Tunisian Arbitration Code,75 disputes relating to nationality 
and personal status are not arbitrable. Similarly, Article 309 of Law No.05/08 
of Morocco provides that, “disputes relating to status of a person, their 
capacity or personal rights that cannot be a subject matter of commerce” are 
non-arbitrable. In this case, both status-related and capacity-related disputes 
are not arbitrable. The implication is that, disputes relating to whether a 
person has a requisite legal personality are non-arbitrable.76 This is one sense 
in which the term “capacity” is used in relation to arbitrability in the African 
context. In a second sense, it is used as a defining criterion in determining 
whether a party has the right (entitlement) to settle a specific dispute by 
arbitration. Some arbitration laws in Africa define arbitrability in terms of rights 
that individuals or entities have the ‘capacity’ (that is, an entitlement) to settle 
or dispose.77 For instance, Article 3326 (1) of the Ethiopian Civil Code 
provides that “the capacity to dispose of a right without consideration shall be 
required for the submission to arbitration of a dispute concerning such right”.78 
Under Article 308 of the Arbitration law of Morocco “persons of the requisite 
capacity can conclude arbitration agreements pertaining to rights that are 
                                                          
73
 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993), Article 7; Arbitration Act No.19 of 2000 (Zambia),s.6; 
Arbitration Act  (Chapter 7:15; Act 6 of 1996) (Zimbabwe),s4  
74
 See e.g. the Arbitration Act, Chapter 6.01, 1959 of Botswana, s.7; Law No.05/08 of Morocco Relating to Arbitration 
and Mediation Agreements, Article 309; South African Arbitration Act 42 of 1965,s.2; Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law 
No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993), Article 7; Arbitration Act of Zambia [No.19 of 2000], s.6(2)(g); and Law No 11/99 of 
Mozambique, Article 6(2) 
75
 Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993 
76
 A question arises here as to what happens when an issue of capacity is raised in the course of arbitration. The 
rationale for precluding an arbitral tribunal from determining a question of capacity in the context of a commercial 
matter is unclear in the absence of a judicial interpretation.  
77
 This is a phrase commonly observed in statutes based on the civil law tradition 
78
 See also the Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt (, supra, Article 11; the International Arbitration Code of Djibouti, 1984, 
Article 2(2); and the OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration, 1999, Article 2. 
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under their free disposal …”79  Not only must individuals have the capacity to 
conclude arbitration agreements, they must also be entitled at law to free 
disposal of the right which is the subject matter of the arbitration. In this 
instance, the legislator sets both objective and subjective criteria for 
arbitrability. 
The second category of disputes incapable of settlement by arbitration 
includes those involving protected persons80 and the family as an institution. 
Section 7 of the Arbitration Act of Botswana, 1959 exempt matrimonial 
causes81 and matters in which persons with legal incapacity may be interested 
from the scope of subject matters that are arbitrable. Section 6(2) of the 
Zambian Arbitration Act, 2000 also exempt from arbitration subject matters 
incidental to a matrimonial cause,82 the determination of paternity, maternity 
or parentage and matters affecting the interest of a minor or a person under 
legal incapacity.83  
 
It is worth noting that not all arbitration laws in Africa exempt matrimonial 
issues from settlement by arbitration. For example, under the Ethiopian Civil 
Code,84 conflicts in cases relating to marriages, divorces and irregular unions 
are arbitrable. Further, some statutes do not provide a blanket exemption of 
matters involving the interests of minors or persons with limited or no legal 
capacity from arbitration. For instance, under the Zambia Arbitration Act, a 
matter affecting the interest of a person under some legal incapacity will be 
arbitrable if the person is represented by a competent person.85 Similarly, the 
Zimbabwe Arbitration Act permits such matters to be settled by arbitration with 
leave of the High court.86 Again, there are generally no blanket exemptions on 
consumer, bankruptcy and related commercial transactions. Section 38 of the 
Kenyan Arbitration Act, 1995 is deliberately designed to ensure that where 
necessary, bankruptcy proceedings could be settled by arbitration.87 Section 8 
of the International Arbitration Act of Mauritius places some additional 
requirements on parties to consumer arbitrations thereby making the 
                                                          
79
 Emphasis added. 
80
 such as minors, persons with legal disabilities generally and consumers 
81
  See also the Namibian Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, s.2 and the Zimbabwean Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4.  cf The 
Ethiopian Civil Code, Title XX Chapter 2, Article 722ff which states that conflicts in cases relating to marriages, 
divorces and irregular unions are arbitrable. 
82
 Save where there is a leave of court to refer such matters to arbitration 
83
  Unless the minor or the person with legal incapacity is represented by a competent person - See section 6(2) (g)  
84
 Title XX Chapter 2, Article 722ff 
85
 The Zambia Arbitration Act, 2000, s6 (2) (g). 
86
 The Zimbabwe Arbitration Act,1996,s.4(2)(e) 
87
 See also the Arbitration Act of Malawi,1967, s.5 
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arbitrability of such matters contingent on compliance with the requirement.88 
These “partial” exemptions are indications that these exempted matters could 
be arbitrable when certain public interest concerns are properly addressed. In 
this sense, these African arbitration statutes are as liberal as the prevailing 
practice in Europe and America on similar subject matters. 
 
The third category of non-arbitrable matters relate to the State and public 
interests matters. Examples of these subject matters could be found under 
various arbitration legislations in Africa. Section 1 of the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798) of Ghana states that the Act applies to all 
matters except those that relate to “(a) the national or public interest; (b) the 
environment; (c) the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution; or (d) 
any other matter that by law cannot be settled by an alternative dispute 
resolution method.”89 The Liberia Commercial code contains similar 
provisions. It states that the chapter of the code on arbitration does not apply 
to matters “involving the determination of liability for the commission of a 
crime,90 a tort, environmental pollution or matters relating to the public interest 
or the Constitution”.91  
 
Compared to earlier categories of non-arbitrable subject matters in the African 
context, this category poses a greater challenge because it entails matters 
which are less specific in scope and have the greatest potential to influence 
commercial transactions. For instance, in the context of international 
arbitration, the question of arbitrability may arise in relation to crime when a 
transaction is alleged to have as its object fraud or bribery and corruption. The 
position on this issue in Europe is that these “crimes” will not deprive an 
arbitral tribunal of the power to determine such a dispute; such an allegation, 
if proved will have to be considered by the tribunal as part of its award.92 This 
popular view is based in part, on the belief that arbitrators are capable and 
have the requisite training and general sense of duty to consider the public 
interest dimension of a matter before them. This may not be the experience of 
many countries in Africa. In the absence of judicial decisions on this matter in 
the African context, it is difficult to gauge to what extent criminal matters (such 
as fraud, bribery and corruption) will be considered arbitrable.  
                                                          
88
 See the International Arbitration Act (of Mauritius) No. 37 of 2008, s.8 (1) which provides as follows: Where a 
contract contains an arbitration agreement and a person enters into that contract as a consumer, the arbitration 
agreement shall be enforceable against the consumer only if the consumer, by separate written agreement entered 
into after the dispute has arisen, certifies that, having read and understood the arbitration agreement, he agrees to be 
bound by it.  
89
 For a discussion of the implications of this section, see Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of 
Ghana’s new Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31 
90
 See also the Zimbabwe Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4(2)(c); Botswana Arbitration Act,1959,s.7 clarifies the aspect of 
criminal matters that remain outwith the scope of arbitration by providing that, “criminal cases, so far as the 
prosecution or punishment thereof is concerned, shall not be submitted to arbitration.”    
91
 Ch. 7 (2010),Article 7.2 (3) 
92
 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov Also known as: Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] 
UKHL 40; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719; Blackaby, Nigel, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern 
and Hunter on international arbitration (5th edn, OUP 2009) para 2.133 -2.141.  
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As states and public entities increasingly become involved in international 
economic transactions, the question remains as to the extent to which matters 
relating to public or national interest could remain outside the scope of 
arbitrable matters.93 Drawing a line in such matters poses a difficulty. Can a 
dispute arising out of a transaction involving a state and a private entity over 
the refurbishment of a power barge at a time when a country is experiencing a 
power crisis constitute a matter relating to public or national interest? Will 
such a matter be arbitrable?94 Then there is the issue of the scope of matters 
relating to constitutional interpretation and enforcement. If a dispute arises in 
the context of a commercial transaction as to whether there has been a 
breach of a constitutional provision,95 can such a dispute be resolved by 
arbitration, for instance, under the Ghana ADR Act?96 Assuming that an 
international arbitral tribunal assumes jurisdiction over such a matter and 
make an award can the enforcement of the award in Ghana be challenged on 
the basis of non-arbitrability under Article V of the New York Convention as 
incorporated into the ADR Act? The absence of precedents makes it difficult 
for a prediction to be made on how the courts will answer such questions. 
 
Even more nebulous are the matters which come under the category called 
“generic exemptions”. The challenge posed by this category is essentially a 
question of latitude. There are significant numbers of arbitration laws which 
employ generic phrases to classify arbitrability. The OHADA Uniform Act, like 
many other arbitration legislations deriving from the civil law tradition, provides 
that natural persons and corporate bodies can submit to arbitration disputes 
on rights of which they have free disposal.97 The Moroccan law on arbitration 
provides that persons of the requisite capacity can conclude arbitration 
agreements “pertaining to rights under their free disposal…”98 The Djibouti law 
on international arbitration states that matters arising out of “juridical 
relationships as to which parties have the capacity to settle” are arbitrable.99 
                                                          
93
 See Mante, J and Ndekugri, I. ‘Arbitrability in the context of Ghana’s new Arbitration Law’ [2012] 2 Int ALR 31,36-
37 
94
 This is a real story involving an African country and currently the subject matter of international arbitration. So the 
answer to this question is yes. 
95
 E.g. where an agreement which is the subject matter of a dispute is alleged not to have complied with a 
constitutional requirement to obtain legislative approval – Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana requires 
that international business and economic transactions to which the government is a party should receive 
parliamentary approval. 
96
 In the Ghanaian case of A-G v Balkan Energy (Ghana) Limited & Ors (the Balkan Energy Case) [2012] 2 SCGLR 
998 the Supreme Court declared an international transaction unconstitutional as it failed to comply with the 
requirements of Article 181(5) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. In the meantime, disputes arising under this 
international transaction are the subject-matter of international arbitration. It remains to be seen how the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement on the effect of the constitutional violation on the transaction will be treated by the arbitral 
tribunal.  
97
 See the OHADA Uniform Act, 1999, Article 2.  
98
 Emphasis added. See Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements, Article 308. 
99
 See the International Arbitration Code, 1984, Article 2(2); see also Law No. 27/1994 of Egypt, Article 11.  
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The difficulty with these phrases is that subject matters within their scope are 
not readily ascertainable. This is also the case for instances where generic 
phrases are used to indicate non-arbitrability. Article 11 of the arbitration law 
of Egypt, 1994 provides that arbitration is not permitted in matters "which 
cannot be subject to compromise”. Under Morocco’s arbitration law, a 
personal right that cannot be subject-matter of commerce is not arbitrable.100 
Matters “that by special law shall be submitted exclusively to a judicial 
court…” and “those that relate to inalienable or non-negotiable rights” are non-
arbitrable under the law of Mozambique.101  
   
Arbitrability and Public policy in Africa 
Unlike the situation in Europe and America, public policy still remains a critical 
determinant of what is arbitrable in the African context. There are instances 
where public policy is expressly made a criterion for non-arbitrability. For 
instance, the arbitration laws of Tunisia,102 Zambia103 and Zimbabwe104 
stipulate that matters of public policy are not arbitrable.105 Where no express 
reference is made to public policy, the rationale for exempting certain 
categories of disputes from arbitration still points to basic morality and justice. 
Given the importance of the family as a basic unit of society and the 
vulnerabilities of minors and persons with legal disabilities, it is 
understandable that matters relating to these categories are considered 
deserving of the protection of the law.  
 
Though difficult to define, principles which constitute public policy may fall 
into, at least, four different categories namely mandatory laws,106 fundamental 
principles of law, public order or good morals and national interest.107 For 
African countries with Constitutions, provisions from these documents 
constitute the fundamental principles of law.108 A violation of such rules is 
                                                          
100
 Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and Mediation Agreements, Article 309 
101
 Law No 11/99 of Mozambique, Article 5(2)(a)&(b) 
102
 Tunisian Arbitration Code (Law No. 93-42 of 26 April 1993),Article 7(1) 
103
 Zambia’s Arbitration Act [No.19 of 2000], s.6 (2) (a) provides that an agreement which is contrary to public policy 
is not arbitrable. 
104
 Zimbabwe’s Arbitration Act, 1996, s.4(2)(a) 
105
 None of these laws defines public policy. 
106
 These are laws which must be applied to both domestic and international transactions irrespective of  the 
governing law of the relevant transaction in view of their fundamental nature- see a more expansive definition in 
Mayer, “Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration”, (1986) 2 Arbitration International 274 at 275. See also 
Böckstiegel, supra, who argues that not all legal rules on arbitrability form part of the public policy of a state  
107
 See the Interim Report of the International Law Association (Committee on International Commercial Arbitration) 
on Public policy, 2000, p. 15 Accessed on 01/08/15, available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/publications/full-
text-publications/general/ila-interim-report-public-policy-2000   
108
 See the Constitution of Ghana, 1992, Article 1(2) where it is stated that the “ Constitution shall be the supreme law 
of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void”; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 which identifies the supremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law as values upon which the country is founded - Article 2 states that law or conduct 
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considered inimical to the security and welfare of the state. Consequently, 
these principles take precedence over all other laws. In a ruling on a matter 
involving an alleged violation of a provision of the Constitution of Ghana in the 
course of an international transaction, the Supreme Court of Ghana per Date-
Bah JSC observed as follows: 
 
Thus, if even statute law is void, if in conflict with the Constitution, a 
fortiori, contracts breaching the Constitution should not be enforced … 
This constitutional provision, in my view, is a peremptory norm that has 
to be heeded by this Court. To borrow from the language of public 
international law, it may be viewed as analogous to ius cogens whose 
enforcement cannot be impeded by the normal rules. This Court, to my 
mind, is thus entitled to refuse to award any damages for the breach of 
what was an unconstitutional contract, even though the appellant has 
been adjudged to be in breach of it.109 
 
Disputes entailing violation of most constitutional provisions will fall within the 
category of principles referred to as “fundamental principles of law” and thus 
will come under the scope of public policy. In the Kenyan case of Christ for all 
Nations v Apollo Insurance Co Ltd,110  Rangera J. defined public policy in the 
context of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award in Kenya as 
entailing any award which is “inconsistent with the constitution or other laws of 
Kenya, whether written or unwritten; or inimical to the national interest of 
Kenya; or contrary to justice and morality”.111 Fundamental issues relating to 
national interest, public order and good morals are generally considered 
sacrosanct and will qualify as matters of public policy in the African context.  
 
Discussion      
The position of African countries on arbitrability, to a large extent, reflects the 
divergent legal systems on the continent. The fifty-three unique legal systems 
on the continent have their roots in at least four distinct legal traditions 
namely, the common law, civil law, customary law and sharia law. These legal 
systems employ different legislative approaches in dealing with the question 
of arbitrability and non-arbitrability.112 Legal systems based on the civil law 
tradition tend to delineate the boundaries of disputes that are arbitrable 
generally by reference to rights which the parties have the capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
inconsistent with it is invalid. The Constitution of Kenya,2010 which identifies general principles of international law 
as part of Kenyan law states as follows: “(4) Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this 
Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this Constitution is 
invalid”. See also the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Article 1(1) & (3). 
109
 Emphasis added. The Attorney-General v Faroe Atlantic Co. Ltd. [2005-2006] SCGLR 271 at 298. 
110
 [2002]2EA 366 
111
 See Nyanchoka, Alfred Oseko, The scope of Arbitrability under Kenyan Law, Arbitration, 2013, 79(3), 273-278. 
112
 See Asouzu, A.A. International commercial arbitration and African states: practice, participation, and institutional 
development (Cambridge University Press 2001)140-176.  
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dispose.113 In this regard, the approach to arbitrability adopted by these legal 
systems is similar to that of most countries in continental Europe.114 In the 
main, most commercial disputes are arbitrable in Africa as is the case in 
Europe and America.  
 
Beyond these similarities, there are areas of divergence between Africa on 
one hand and Europe and America on the other. Three of these differences 
are briefly outlined. Firstly, current issues on arbitrability in Africa differ 
considerably from those in Europe and America. In Africa, questions of 
arbitrability may arise in relation to disputes concerning constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement, public or national interests, crime, 
environmental issues and public policy. In Europe and America, current 
issues on arbitrability relate to disputes concerning patents and trademarks, 
insolvency, antitrust and competition laws, fraud and bribery and corruption. 
Secondly, the developments on arbitrability in Europe and America have been 
largely driven by judicial interpretation which has favoured the presumption of 
arbitrability.115 The story in Africa is different - there has been very little by 
way of judicial decisions on arbitrability and related matters due to the number 
of international arbitrations on the continent and the marginal opportunities 
available to African courts to develop arbitration jurisprudence.   
 
The erosion of the concept of arbitrability in Europe and America has also 
been on the basis of arguments exploring the real rationale of the concept of 
arbitrability. It has been argued that the question of arbitrability has to do with 
the natural limitations of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism of 
consensual character.116 Using arbitration to determine third party disputes or 
matters of public nature will be in conflict with the very nature of the 
process.117 This rationale for arbitrability gives rise to the need for states to 
make decisions on what disputes can justifiably be settled by arbitration. In 
making such decisions, the question of the legitimacy of the process of 
arbitration and the role of the arbitrator also arises. Unlike judges who are 
formally appointed under law by the state to carry out judicial functions, 
arbitrators are appointed by private individuals or entities and are not bound 
by law to protect the public or the state against morally offensive and unjust 
actions or, indeed, consider policy implications of their decisions.  
                                                          
113
 See the OHADA Uniform Act, 1999, Article 2 and the Moroccan Law No.05/08 Relating to Arbitration and 
Mediation Agreements, Article 308.  
114
 France, The Netherlands, Italy etc. 
115
 See Moses Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc  473 U.S. 614 S Ct 3346 (1985)  (U.S. Supreme Court, 2 July 1985); 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.  417 US 515 – 521; Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov  Also known as: Premium 
Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40.  
116
 Brekoulakis, S. ‘On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of Concern in Mistelis, L. A. and 
Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 
2009)19,20 
117
 Youssef, K.Y. ‘The death of Inarbitrability’ in in Mistelis, L. A. and Brekoulakis, S. L. (eds.) Arbitrability: 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009)47 
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These considerations (that is, the natural limitations of arbitration as a 
consensual process and the legitimacy and role of the arbitrator) are among 
the vital factors which may weigh on the mind of African law makers enacting 
laws on arbitrability. Within the context of strong perception of bias against 
African states involved in international arbitration118 and a misperception 
about the competence and roles of arbitrators, there is a good reason why 
arbitrators may not be accorded the same legitimacy that judges enjoy in 
Africa. Armfelt captured the rationale for this argument in the following terms: 
 
International arbitration converts disputes with significant legal, 
regulatory and policy dimensions into purely private contractual 
disagreements. Courts, whose duty it is to administer justice pursuant 
to law and policy, are replaced with private panels that often see their 
mission as merely to settle disagreements in accordance with ‘general’ 
legal principles and prevailing business practices that favour 
transnational corporations. This type of private justice inevitably 
ignores the legitimate regulatory interests of concerned states.119  
 
In this context, merely vouching for the neutrality of arbitrators or indeed 
asserting that the procedures meet the requirements of due process will not 
be sufficient. Consequently, arbitrability defined on the basis of public policy 
ultimately becomes a safeguard. The implication of the foregoing argument is 
that the question of arbitrability has a contextual dimension and this is often 
ignored in the discussion on the relationship between public policy and the 




The concept of arbitrability is an enigma. In one sense, it appears insignificant 
in view of the fact that commercial matters are generally arbitrable in many 
countries in the world.120 In another sense, this conclusion leads to the 
question as to why such an ‘insignificant’ concept still commands the attention 
of scholars.121 The significance of the concept of arbitrability has been 
immortalised by Article V (2) (a) of the New York Convention. Similarly, Article 
34(2) (a) (i) of the UNCITRAL Model Law has been widely incorporated into 
many arbitration laws across the globe implying that national courts 
determining applications for recognition and enforcement of foreign awards 
still have power to refuse enforcement on the basis that the subject matter of 
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the arbitration is not capable of settlement by arbitration in the jurisdiction 
concerned. In effect, even if the concept of arbitrability does not succeed in 
stopping the hand of a tribunal from determining a matter, it may end up 
stifling the enforcement of its handiwork, the award. 
 
Given the significance of the concept of arbitrability, it is vital that business 
entities involved in international transactions do not speciously extrapolate 
knowledge of what pertains in Europe and America across all jurisdictions and 
regions of the world. In Africa, a number of trends on arbitrability are 
discernible. Most commercial disputes are generally arbitrable and this 
observation generally aligns with practice in Europe and America. Beyond 
this, there are three significant differences in the areas of scope of subject 
matter, approaches to arbitrability regulation and the role of public policy. 
Firstly, subject-matters which are non-arbitrable in Africa are comparatively 
broader in scope and differ in terms of subject matters of interest.  
Commercial disputes may be embroiled with public interest, constitutional 
interpretation, tort or other non-arbitrable issues, especially so when a State 
or a public body is a party to such a dispute. 
 
 Secondly, the approaches to regulating the question of arbitrability differ. 
Judicial activism which has transformed the arbitrability ‘landscape’ in Europe 
and America are generally absent in Africa. Two trends are observable from 
the legislative approaches adopted by African states. Generally, a distinction 
is maintained between domestic and international arbitration. Where there is 
legislative emphasis on international arbitration, issues of non-arbitrability are 
generally muted. Even so, there is clear indication that many African countries 
are unwilling to do away with rules on non-arbitrability in the context of 
domestic arbitration, and in some cases, even in the context of international 
arbitration. The rationale for this practice is linked to the third significant 
difference between practice in Africa on one hand and Europe and America 
on the other, namely the role of public policy in deciding what is non-
arbitrable. Public policy is considered a vital safeguard for many African 
countries against perceived “biased arbitral tribunals” who may have as their 
main objective the satisfaction of commercial interests. Thus, the 
determination of the question as to what is or is not arbitrable does not 
depend solely on the natural boundaries or limitations of arbitration but also a 
desire to safeguard national legal, institutional and economic interests. Could 
it be that the dirge of non-arbitrability has been sang too soon?122  
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